Minority Views on the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act

4.  Detailed Findings(continued)

4.  Detailed Findings (continued)

4.3 Reactions to the ATA (continued)

4.3.3 Listing of Terrorist Entities

Each respondent was issued a simplified one-page printed handout summarizing the listing of terrorist entities, and was given a few minutes to read it over before the group discussion took place. Note that participants and groups focused mainly on self-selected aspects. 

Overall Reaction

Even though some participants in various locations had vague recollections about a list or listing, no one seemed informed about the listing of terrorist entities provision.  This was one of the most sensitive topics discussed, particularly among some Arab/West Indian groups, who spoke quite passionately about the subject.

Participants gave general approval in principle to the intent of such a listing.

Most felt it was important for the government to inform the public about who was considered a terrorist, to prevent people from unknowingly making donations and possibly opening themselves up to legal action.  However, several participants in various locations found it hard to understand why known terrorists would be listed instead of simply being arrested or even "killed" outright (like they would be in their countries of origin).  Instead of listing terrorist entities, a suggestion was made that the government publish a listing of legitimate or valid groups or organizations.

It's more important to have a list of accredited entities. (Halifax Group 1)

However, overall, there were many concerns and questions raised over the enormous potential for harm due to both the public nature of the list, and to what were referred to as "grey areas," including:  (1) the potential for stereotyping ethnic minorities, (2) credible sources of information, (3) accuracy of information and safeguards against inaccuracy, (4) specific aspects of the provision (such as reasonable grounds, the public international sharing of the list, the Federal Cabinet as decision-maker, and the ability to appeal), (5) the loss of civil liberties (mainly privacy) and (6) questions about operational aspects.

  1. Ethnic minority stereotyping -- some participants in all locations were especially fearful about the general public's stereotyping of ethnic minorities.  People in all 3 Montreal francophone groups worried if everyone belonging to an ethnic minority would now be suspected.
    • People will be brainwashed – they'll see an Arab person and assume they're a terrorist. (Toronto Group 1)
    • Some participants were quite concerned that the list would include common mid-eastern names, or names similar to those of known terrorists.  In fact, a Calgary woman with a common Arabic name (but who was not of Middle-Eastern origin) had her passport held back for a week.  One Montreal Group 1 participant had the same name as a terrorist listed by the FBI, and had many problems as a result.
    • Some associated a list with the "McCarthy era," where there was "guilt by association" and the need to tread very carefully.
    • In several locations, participants worried that innocent people could be hurt just because they sympathized with the average Palestinian.
  2. Credible sources of information – this was a concern to participants in various groups, who wondered mainly about sources and their credibility, and asked.
    • Who provides the information, and whose sources are used.  For example, some participants in Montreal felt that proof could be fabricated if the government or police wanted to list a particular group or individual.   According to a Toronto visible minority respondent, a mistranslation of recent Hezbollah comments got it put on a terrorist list, but according to this individual, this group is not a terrorist group.  A Vancouver Group 1 woman worried that a disgruntled or angry neighbour could give your name.
    • How credible are these sources, how effective is the intelligence.  For example, for some Group 1 participants in Montreal, Calgary and Vancouver, information was not credible or acceptable if it came from a US decision.  A Calgary respondent worried that opposing special interest groups could identify other groups to the government as terrorists regardless of their activities.
  3. Accuracy of information – this concern was raised primarily in Halifax, where participants wondered how Canadians could be assured the list is accurate, and what safeguards are in place to ensure listed entities are in fact terrorist groups, or have links to terrorist organizations?
  4. Specific aspects of the provision – 4 aspects were the focus of concerns across target groups and locations.
    • 4.1) Reasonable grounds were considered too open to interpretation by participants across locations, who seemed to interpret it as meaning not-solid grounds.  For example, some participants said that back in their countries of birth, reasonable grounds meant that everyone could be targeted, and wondered if that applied here in Canada too.  "You could get in trouble for just talking about things". (Toronto Group 2)
      • People fighting for their legitimate rights in another country might be put on the list and prevented from coming here.
      • There are groups that could be listed as freedom fighters by some, and terrorists by others.
      • C'est pas parce que tu donnes de l'argent à des terroristes que tu es un terroriste. (Just because you give money to terrorists doesn't mean you are a terrorist.) (Montreal Group 1)
    • 4.2) The public nature of the list made any mistakes life-destroying for the innocent, according to participants in all locations, and was considered a gross invasion of privacy by some.  Arab/West Asian participants especially feared publication because it would most likely contain only names of Arab or Muslim people and organisations, reinforcing public pressure on them as a community.
      • The list should not be public – easy accessibility to the list will bring attacks directed at individuals. (Montreal Anglophone Group 3)
      • If the media has posted your name, you are guilty until proven innocent (a sentiment uttered by participants in several groups).
    • 4.3) The Federal Cabinet as decision-maker – this was not clear to everyone or discussed by all groups. 
      • Some felt that Cabinet decisions could be politically motivated, biased and/or influenced by financial contributions to their party.   Some in various locations preferred a more impartial and independent watchdog, such as a judge, or someone like the Privacy Commissioner.  In addition, the government, being run by humans, can "make mistakes."
    • 4.4) The ability to appeal -- was absolutely seen as a positive aspect by participants in all locations.
      • We would never have this ability to appeal where we came from. (Calgary Group 2)
      • However, there were concerns expressed across locations – mainly due to the public nature of the listing, where the appeal could not remedy harm already done – a typical comment "You are stigmatized for life even if you win the appeal."
      • In addition, some in the Arab/West Asian Montreal group saw the appeal process as a way to discharge responsibility onto citizens – for example, a group was listed, you gave money to them, it is up to you to prove you did not know they were a listed terrorist group.
      • One individual from Calgary thought the government should inform people if they are on the list so they could prove their innocence.
  5. Loss of civil liberties -- some participants in various groups, especially Calgary, also expressed concern about the invasion of privacy.
    • If we assume that the number of terrorist organizations will not grow, why would we put a tool in the government's hands that would allow them to check out basically any group they want - invasion of privacy of corporations, companies, or persons.  Someone makes a lobby, no proof, the government can check out anyone. (Calgary Group 2)
  6. Questions about operational aspects -- were raised in various groups and locales.  Participants wanted to know what happens once a terrorist was identified.
    • What do they do to them?
    • Are they dealt with or are they sent out of the country? 
    • What happens to the people who are detained?
    • Does the government go in and shut down the operation -- if they don't, what's the point?

In sum, while there were many concerns and questions raised about the listing of terrorist entities, on the whole, participants voiced support for the intent of such a listing. 

Perceived Effect on Fundraising

While the summarized listing of terrorist entities provision did not mention limiting terrorist fundraising as a benefit, a question about fundraising did emerge while discussing the listing provision.  Overall, no clear trend emerged from the discussions about the perceived effect of listing entities on terrorist fundraising.  However, there were 2 main trains of thought:  it would either hamper fundraising, or it would have no measurable impact on fundraising.

On the one hand, some participants thought it would hamper fund-raising because

On the other hand, some participants thought it would have no measurable impact in part due to certain perceptions about terrorists:

In sum, even though participants had their doubts about effectiveness, most still wanted the possible protection that listing offered because "Something is better than nothing." 

Perceived Usefulness

Most participants generally thought the listing provision was useful or at least semi-useful in hindering the flow of money to terrorists -- even though it certainly had limitations.  The seeming link between the listing provision and fundraising tended to increase and expand perceived usefulness and somewhat improve acceptance of the public nature of the list.

However, some participants, including a majority in Montreal, did not see the listing provision as useful because (1) terrorists were too clever, (2) unknown and unlisted terrorists were the most dangerous, and (3) mistrust of the listing mechanism, due to the credibility and accuracy of information, and the potential to fabricate proof

Generally, participants agreed that this listing provision had little or no ability to prevent terrorist acts. 

One person from Calgary said the most useful tool to prevent terrorism was Canada's neutrality and peacekeeping role in the world.  Several indicated that the most useful way to prevent terrorist acts in Canada was to keep our distance from the US.

Desire for Information

Interest in more information about the listing provision was high, especially among those with mid-eastern backgrounds.  Despite its flaws, the listing provision was considered very important.  It was a good idea to tell Canadians who "not to give money to." 

However, participants added 2 main caveats: (1) The procedure must be absolutely meticulous" (Toronto Group 1), and (2) American recommendations should be excluded from the list – at least according to some visible minority participants.