The Views of Canadian Scholars on the Impact of the Anti-Terrorism Act

10. WESLEY K. WARK Department of History/International Studies, University of Toronto (continued)

10.3 How should our country respond to these trends and threats? Please feel free to include measures at any level, such as social, economic, political, or legal or a combination of these levels.

We now live in a “ worst case ” universe, post-September 11. US national security strategy, and indeed intelligence assessments in both Washington and London, are based on this presumption. We have to assume the reality of threats to national security and provide for the maximum possible capacity to know, pre-empt and respond to such threats. “ Maximum possible ” is, of course, a slippery phrase and encompasses such limiting factors as public sentiment, preservation of democratic norms, and fiscal probity. It is obviously no good to have unwanted, financially ruinous capabilities, just as it is no good to have inadequate ones. “ Maximum possible ” means, in the world of real politics, “ sustainable ”.

Criteria for a sustainable Canadian response to terrorist threats can be outlined. A more extensive and detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.

The following is a checklist of requirements:

  1. A national security strategy for dealing with trans-national terrorism. We currently don't have such a strategy, though it is promised by the new Martin government.
  2. A capacity to translate a national security strategy into coherent government planning. This requires effective Cabinet level coordination and effective inter-departmental coordination on security and intelligence issues. Historically, this has been lacking. Again, there are promises of major reforms by the new Martin government.
  3. A capacity to act on Canadian policy through military, political and development aid instruments. Our military capacity is fatally weak and no real doctrine for military counter-terrorism exists; our diplomatic strength is questionable, and our overseas development capacity is under-resourced and ill-focussed. Promised and long-overdue reviews of defence and foreign policy may help.
  4. A capacity to know. September 11 should have driven home one essential fact: that the first-line of defence against terrorism is good intelligence. While I doubt that this lessons is firmly understood in Ottawa, there are some encouraging signs of change, including increased spending on security and intelligence, a new mandate for CSE, greater resources for intelligence analysis, more intelligence sharing horizontally within government and vertically between different levels of government (federal, provincial, municipal). Measures to further raise the profile of intelligence in the federal government, to increase centralization and coordination of the intelligence effort, and to add capability, including the constitution of a foreign intelligence service, are still, in my view, required.
  5. A capacity for alliance burden sharing. The global war on terrorism requires a Canadian capacity to share burdens, resources and intelligence with key allies and partners. Our ability to do these things is a measure of our ally-worthiness. We are, in my view, too dependent on traditional allies and on foreign intelligence services for information. We lack “informational sovereignty.” New investments in military capabilities, development aid, political reporting and intelligence are required for Canada to serve its own national security interests and to take part, as we deem appropriate, in global action.
  6. Public knowledge. Popular support for government policies and spending priorities is crucial for any sustainable national security strategy. Yet public knowledge of terrorism, terrorist threats, Canadian capabilities and policies are all weak. Increased public knowledge can only be gained by long-term strategies, including new programmes for research, teaching and publication in Canadian universities on the subject of national security. Increased public knowledge can also flow from a greater willingness on the part of the federal government to engage in the public dissemination of information about terrorist and other national security threats through such means as declassified intelligence threat assessments, white papers and other public strategy documents, public briefings and appearances by knowledgeable officials and politicians, and increased levels of debate in Parliament. The announced decision to create a standing national security committee in the House of Commons is an encouraging step in the direction of greater public awareness of the issues. Attention needs also to be paid to the question of how and in what circumstances the Canadian public need to be alerted to changing levels of terrorist threats.
  7. Border and travel security. Much attention has been paid since September 11 to the need to secure our borders, and provide for maritime and air travel security. Progress is evidently being made, while the Senate committee on National Security and Defence under the chairmanship of Senator Colin Kenny has provided an important service in monitoring progress in security practices in these fields. The greatest deficiencies appear to exist in the realm of maritime security, which includes not only the physical security of ports but also the ability to monitor and control maritime traffic into and out of Canadian ports. Maritime terrorism is already a reality and the prospects of more attacks to come, either on military targets or civilian ones, cannot be discounted. Neither can the scenario by which terrorists and terrorist weapons, including WMD, find entry into Canada through maritime channels be dismissed.
  8. First responders. Being prepared for terrorism involves more than a focus on prevention and pre-emption. Canada must also undertake measures to allow for the best possible response in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack in Canada, or against Canadian entities overseas. This lesson seemed obvious in the immediate aftermath of September 11, but is likely to lose force as more and more time elapses. Adequate levels of equipment and training for first responders as well as medical resources and drug stockpiles all need to be part of a national plan, coordinated with provincial and municipal authorities. Exercises need to be run to test first responder capabilities in a variety of scenarios.
  9. Root causes. The root causes of terrorism are a matter of great controversy. We need a made-in-Canada debate and, ultimately, policy on this issue. While this is taking shape, the Canadian role in Afghanistan needs to be pondered as a test case for action against “root causes” (failed states as terrorist havens; failed states as political, economic and religious breeding grounds for terrorism).

10.3.1 Addendum. Omnibus Problems in Bill C-36

The decision of the government to use Bill C-36 to opportunistically forward some legislation that had little direct bearing on anti-terrorism stored up problems for the future. Revisions to the official secrets act, now the security of information act, produced some unwarranted and ill-considered features. Without going into detail, I would highlight such problematic provisions as the broad definition of “ special operational information,” the identification of large classes of individuals as persons “ permanently bound to secrecy ” and the very narrow codification of legitimate whistle-blowing. Bill C-36 amendments to the Access to Information Act to allow for the use of certificates to prevent the disclosure of certain types of information also seem excessive, especially in the light of the very strong powers afforded to the government under the Access Act to protect legitimate secrets.

10.3.2 Conclusion

Bill C-36 represents the beginning of a process to address the threat posed by terrorism. But the inevitable focus in the Bill on legal instruments, in the absence of a declared national strategy on terrorism, and without attendant reforms in the security and intelligence sector of the federal government, left the engineering of Canadian anti-terrorism policy incomplete. It also left the necessary public debate on terrorism unresolved and somewhat polarized.