Minority Views on the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act

4.  Detailed Findings (continued)

4.  Detailed Findings (continued)

4.3 Reactions to the ATA (continued)

4.3.5 New Investigative and Preventive Powers

Note that each respondent was given a 2-page handout summarizing the new investigative and preventive powers (compared to 1-page handouts for the others), but the same amount of time to read and digest the information before the group discussion took place. Note that participants and groups focused mainly on self-selected aspects.  Respondent reaction tended to focus more on the investigative powers (the first page of the handout) than on the preventive powers.

Overall Reaction

Only a few in various groups had heard of these new police powers.  While some considered these new powers unnecessary, overall, they were generally considered acceptable despite the perceived and worrisome risks of abuse. 

I grew up in a policing society (Hungary), and I like it that we don't have that here. (Calgary Group 3)

In various locations, this was viewed as the most important element of the Anti-terrorism Act – the one with the most far-reaching impact on citizens in general, and on minority groups and individuals in particular.  In fact, participants in almost all groups had talked about police matters spontaneously from the beginning of the groups and throughout.

This is what we have to do [now], but what will happen 10 years from now. I fear we are slipping into a police state. (Halifax Group1)

Some questioned the need for these exceptional powers because they did not perceive the current situation as being exceptional, since the perceived likelihood of terrorist acts was quite low in all groups – "We are in Canada, not the US."

Support

Participants in all groups who supported these new powers seemed to understand the compromises necessary to deal with terrorism, and felt that those with nothing to hide need not worry.

General concerns

Concerns voiced in most groups focused on 4 perceived applications related to abuse – (1) arrest of the innocent, (2) targeting of ethnic minorities, (3) potential misinterpretation and misuse, and (4) potential abuse by police.

  1. Arrest of the innocent – participants worried that anyone could be arrested anytime, especially innocent people.
    • What about the person who is not guilty – they've been arrested and their life is a mess. (Toronto Group 1)
  2. Targeting of ethnic minorities – participants in all locations thought the likelihood was high that ethnic minorities and immigrants would be targeted.  Some were particularly worried about what had already happened in the US, with minorities being detained for up to a year before being declared innocent.
    • It doesn't seem too fair, is based on suspicions. (Toronto Group 2)
    • We [immigrants] are more likely to be attacked, than a Canadian … like old dictator Russia, if a judge is convinced that you are a terrorist, than the government can act on political motivation. (Calgary Group 1)
    However, there were some participants in various locations who were not worried about such targeting.
    • I don't think police will target those with a minority ethnic background - I feel comfortable - they have the training.  Canada is very open to different ethnic people. (Calgary Group 2)
  3. Potential misinterpretation and misuse – some thought the new provisions gave police fairly broad powers, and some felt the vague language and terms needed to be clearer, because they were subject to interpretation and potential misuse.  One respondent from Montreal worried about misuse by the federal government.
    • Government conspiracy – taking advantage of an already fearful nation. (Montreal Anglophone Group 3)
  4. Potential police abuse of power – this frightened a fair number of participants in various locations, who had already either personally experienced some sort of police abuse, or knew someone or about someone who had.  Many were also knowledgeable about police abuses in the US
    • I had a bad experience with city police last week. (Toronto Group 1) 
    • You and your friends can be arrested; we will have to be very very careful with this legislation. (Calgary Group 1)
    • It assumes we have very intelligent police officers and government officials – I just hope they're intelligent and well trained. (Toronto Group 3)
    • Power you give them, might be more power for them to abuse, like the case of Leonard Peltier, I say the authorities can abuse their power. (Vancouver Group 2)
    • Only people with money have the means to sue to police for wrongful use. (Vancouver Group 2)
Specific aspects of the new police powers

Discussions centred around 4 aspects of the new police powers – (1) the wiretapping provision (2) refusing to give information as an offence, (3) arrest without warrant, and (4) reasonable grounds.

  1. The wiretapping provision – This was discussed in all groups, received the most attention, and met with general approval, even by Arab/West Asian groups, who were considered by many to be likely wiretap targets.  In the Montreal Group 1, participants said they would simply adapt, but there would be no more joking over the phone.
    • I think its okay to wiretap people because it benefits the public. (Toronto Group 1)

    Some Group 1 participants had questions about wire-tapping, mainly related to wiretap eligibility.

    • How do they know in the first place they need to tap you? (Montreal)
    • How do you understand what constitutes what an offence is? (Calgary)

    Concerns were also expressed about various other "big brother" or "Stalinist" aspects of the wiretap provision, namely that it was permissible even if other surveillance methods would work, and that it was a definite invasion of privacy.

    The 1-year notification aspect elicited comments in various groups.  Some felt a year was too long, while a few others realized it took time to build a case.

    If they know someone's a terrorist, why would you take a year to do something? (Toronto Group 3)

    Some in Montreal Group 1 could not understand why police would just listen to terrorists, but not arrest them (as was the practice "back home" in their countries of origin).

    Some in Calgary Group 1 thought the individual being taped should never be informed – "Why alert them?"

  2. The offence to refuse to give information was discussed in various locations, and generated some confusion and apprehension related mainly to its application, and potential for abuse, based mainly on guilt by association
    • I could be involved with a terrorist act even though I am totally innocent, if I am associated with a terrorist who has been arrested. (Calgary Group 2)
    • How do they know if you know something or not? (Montreal Anglophone Group 3)

    A Vancouver woman worried that a casual comment from a mere acquaintance could potentially involve her, an innocent person.

    Someone says something to me, now I am involved. (Vancouver Group 1)

    Some questions emerged in various locations related to the media's refusal to give information, punishment for refusal and police protection if someone was threatened not to divulge information, for example, typical questions were:

    • It's a question of the press and anonymous sources -- must they reveal a source? 
    • So what is the punishment for refusing to give information?
    • What if you've been threatened to not give information – does the government protect you?
  3. The lack of warrant needed to make a preventive arrest sparked a bit of discussion and mixed reaction in the Calgary non-visible minority group, and elsewhere.  One respondent saw it as a good thing, if the police had enough evidence, while another felt this was open to abuse because the police could go in under false pretences.
    • They can go in "if it's believed" - if who believes?  Who makes the decision? (Calgary Group 3)
    • The police arrest first, and worry [about a warrant] later. (Halifax Group 2)
  4. Reasonable grounds needed for a preventive arrest was commented on only by a few in the English Montreal group in relation to the new powers, who felt this term was too vague, and could involve anybody. (This term was discussed more thoroughly in connection with the listing of terrorist entities provision).

In sum, while the new police powers generated considerable discussion (sometimes heated) about the potential risks of abuse, they were generally considered important preventive tools and were accepted by the majority of participants. 

Perceived Usefulness

Overall, the new police powers were seen by most as an efficient preventive tool, with a strong risk for misuse.

Dissenting views on usefulness tended to centre on the investigative powers, especially wiretapping (it's limitations vs. widely-held perceptions about the cleverness of terrorists), and the idea that all of these elements could be dealt with in the Anti-terrorism Act.

Desire for Information

Participants in all groups definitely wanted to be informed about these new police powers.  Arab/West Asian groups were especially keen, because they believed they needed the information in order to adapt to it and protect themselves.  Because they feared being targeted and potential abuses, they felt they needed to be careful to avoid "grey areas."

4.3.6 Mechanisms Associated with Preventive and Investigative Powers

Sunset Clause

The sunset clause was verbally described to participants as follows, before they were queried:  "The new preventive and investigative hearing powers will disappear after 5 years (called a 'sunset' clause) unless both the House of Commons and the Senate pass a resolution to extend them for another 5 years."

The sunset clause, virtually unheard of before, was probably one of the most misunderstood concepts in this study.  When seen as a safeguard and protective mechanism, it was approved.  But when it was not understood as a safeguard and protection, people put their own spin on its meaning.

Several participants in various groups voiced strong approval for the sunset clause, which was viewed as a step in the right direction to ensure the new powers would not be unfairly applied and the rights of individuals would be upheld.

Very good idea - we should not commit ourselves to a longer period of time - see if it works.  (Calgary Group 2)

However, most participants in all 5 locations did not understand this clause or the intent, and interpreted it in one of 4 ways – (1) as an expectation that terrorism would not be a problem after 5 years, 2) as reinforcement of the perception that the new powers were dangerous, (3) as an opportunity to review, replace or update the law, and (4) as a worry that adjustments could not be made during the 5-year period.

  1. Expectation that terrorism would not be a problem, or that anti-terrorism laws would not be necessary after 5 years – this occurred in various locations, across target groups – which totally bypassed the safeguard intent.
    • Can you defeat terrorism in 5 years? (Toronto Group 1)
    • Why stop after 5 years, terrorism will still be there. (Montreal Groups 2 and 3)
    • I agree with reviewing, but I'm not so thrilled that it might die out, if nothing happens -- people might say, ahh, we don't need it. (Toronto Group 3)
  2. Reinforced perception that police powers were dangerous – this interpretation occurred mainly but not exclusively in the Montreal Arab/West Asian group, and strongly contradicted the safeguard intent.
    • Ça me rend encore plus méfiant car ça veut dire qu'ils vont pouvoir abuser pendant 5 ans. (It makes me even more mistrustful because it means they have the power to abuse for 5 years.)
    • The government doesn't know how far abuses will go and decided on a self-destruction clause.
  3. Opportunity to review, update and replace the law, if necessary – some participants in various locations viewed the 5-year period this way, and missed the safeguard and protective intent.
    • Think this is good that this will disappear after 5 years, so they can make new laws. (Vancouver Group 1) 
    • They might come up with better ideas in 5 years. (Toronto Group 3)
    • Most laws should be like that because they become outdated very quickly. (Calgary Group 1) 
  4. Worry that adjustments not permitted during the 5-year period – this was mentioned only in Calgary and missed the intent.
    • If there is something that is not working in the 5 years, is there a clause that they could do something if it's not working.  Can they stop it?  (Calgary Group 2)

In sum, because most participants did not interpret or understand the sunset clause as a safeguard or protection, they did not approve of it. However, those who correctly interpreted the clause voiced strong approval.