Minority Views on the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act

4.  Detailed Findings(continued)

4.  Detailed Findings (continued)

4.3 Reactions to the ATA (continued)

4.3.6 Mechanisms Associated with Preventive and Investigative Powers (continued)

Reporting Obligation

Similar to the sunset clause, the reporting obligation was verbally described to participants as follows, before they were queried:  "The Attorney General and Solicitor General of Canada are required to report annually to Parliament on the use of these new powers."

Overall, participants not only approved of but also consistently saw the annual reporting requirement in a positive light, albeit to varying degrees, because it provided much-needed "accountability" and "checks and balances."

Comments were mostly favourable, and some took a wait-and-see approach.

If done every year, it will be sufficient to monitor how the Act is being used. (Vancouver Group 2)

In several Group 1 discussions, it seemed especially important, very positive and reassuring because it gave some control over the application of the special police powers.  However, it would be important to specify in the report how the ATA is applied to citizens from certain communities.  Some hoped that people from those communities would be on the reporting committee.

Some participants in various groups pointed to 4 main issues relevant to the reporting obligation, including -- (1) reporting frequency, (2) unbiased and accurate information, (3) government transparency, and (4) the preference for an independent watchdog.

  1. Reporting frequency – most participants felt that the annual or yearly reporting was sufficient, however some preferred a more frequent or ad hoc schedule.
    • If it's reported a year after the fact, it may be too late, why not report on each incident as it happens? (Toronto Group 2)
  2. Unbiased and accurate information – several participants in various locations expressed the hope (thus implying doubt) that the information in the report would be accurate, comprehensive and unbiased.
    • Depends on how accurate the reporting is and where the information is coming from. (Vancouver Group 3)
    • Reporting has to be neutral and not biased, has to be comprehensive, otherwise it will fail. (Calgary Group 2)
  3. Government transparency – some participants, mainly but not exclusively from Halifax, wondered if the report would be made public in its entirety, or only what the government wanted to reveal.  Some also voiced uncertainty about transparency, since disclosure of sensitive information could damage the government's public image.
    • You need a strong opposition in government. (Toronto Group 2)
  4. Independent watchdog – several participants in various locations felt that an "independent watchdog" would provide greater accountability and make sure everyone was playing by the rules.

The only real criticism of the reporting obligation was that it was insufficient to curb potential abuse.

Think it is good to monitor the progress of issues.  Agree with reporting, but don't think it is enough. (Vancouver Group 1)

In sum, the reporting obligation was generally understood and seen to be a positive safeguard against potential abuses of the new police powers.

Effectiveness of Mechanisms to Prevent Abuse

As mentioned elsewhere in the report, participants in most groups expressed concerns that the new police powers had the potential for abuse against visible minorities, especially those from Arab/West Asian communities.  Overall, likelihood of abuse by police ranged from moderate to high, and seemed highest among Montreal Group 1 participants.

C'est difficile à contrôler, car ils se couvrent entre policiers confrères. (It is hard to control because they cover each other in the police)

Participants' views about police abuse seemed to be strongly influenced by (1) their experiences with police in their countries of origin, (2) by media coverage of what was happening in the US, and (3) by prior personal or second-hand experience of the police in Canada.  Not surprisingly, views about protective legal mechanisms or safeguards were similarly influenced by these 3 factors:

  1. Countries of origin – many participants talked about how they (or their families) came from countries where there were few if any legal safeguards or protections -- that such protections could even exist gave many a strong feeling of relief and of confidence in the Canadian way.
    • There is a lot of accountability here -- you have the freedom to pick up the phone and complain or investigate … in other countries [like Egypt] you can't do this. (Calgary Group 1)
  2. Media-reported US incidents – many participants, especially those in Groups 1 and 2, were increasingly disturbed by what they saw happening in the US, where there seemed to be no legal safeguards in the hyped-up terror-alert atmosphere – this only served to enhance the value of the 2 Canadian anti-terror safety mechanisms.
  3. Experience with Canadian police – throughout the discussions, participants talked about first or second-hand (or even third-hand) exposure to negative police incidents, which made many either sceptical or mistrustful of the police.  However, not everyone felt this way.  For example, some Calgary participants agreed with the individual who said:
    • Maybe I'm too optimistic, but I think there's a chain of accountability within the police department that I tend to trust the system as a whole.  Perhaps an action might be started in the wrong direction, but at some point in the system, that will be corrected. (Calgary Group 2)

Overall, participants were generally either open-minded or hopeful that the reporting mechanism and sunset clause would prevent abuse.  Most were willing to give them a chance, and took a "wait-and-see" approach.  The sunset clause and reporting obligation helped to mitigate the negative influence surrounding police, but did not erase it entirely.  For example, in Montreal, while these control mechanisms were considered "better than nothing," they were not good enough for Group 1 participants, who saw themselves as likely targets.

However, several individuals worried that the law and the courts were extremely slow moving, as evidenced by the Air India trials, and so doubted the impact of legal mechanisms as a remedy.  There was also some scepticism about government transparency.

If they misuse it, they'll find a way to hide it. (Toronto Group 1) 

According to one individual, a stronger protection would be Canada's free press and democratic tradition.

Canadians and the news media will uncover and fight for the wrongly accused. (Calgary Group 2)

Attitudes Towards Risk of Abuse

Despite general concerns about the risk of police abuse and potential targeting of ethnic minorities, a majority of participants felt the risk of having the ATA was acceptable – to give better protection to the country and the people -- with one main caveat which was repeated in various discussions.

As long as I'm treated with respect and dignity, then I accept it, and cooperate. (Toronto Group 1)

Even Montreal francophone participants felt the risks were worth taking, and that targeting did not necessarily mean abuse.

S'ils suspectent le groupe xyz, ils devraient surveiller le groupe ethnique xyz. Aucun lien avec la race, c'est de la sécurité. (If they suspect any given ethnic group, they should concentrate their surveillance on them. This is not racism, only sound security measures.)

Others said the risk was acceptable because of the control mechanisms, and because the law was realistic, balanced, reassuring and "better than nothing."

On the other hand, some participants in various groups found the risk unacceptable because of police mistrust, the Orwellian-like preventive section where you are guilty until proven innocent, perceptions of terrorists as able to counteract preventive efforts, and because it was not really necessary.

In sum, even though participants were concerned about potential abuses, the majority preferred the risk of having the ATA to the risk of not having anti-terrorism legislation.